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Keynesian social policy and viewing Britain as a federal partner rather than a European leader. 5 In the words of one novel from the era, here were plans to 'demote this country from a world power to a sort of garden suburb of Europe'. 6 'Euro-loaves' and 'Euro-beer', but was driven by a faltering economy to submit a second application in 1967 (again vetoed by de Gaulle). 8 Although Edward Heath finally led Britain into the EEC on 1 January 1973, the constitutional stipulations of the Treaty of Rome, particularly the demands of 'an ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe', were played down in public addresses, which aimed to reduce public alarm by highlighting the economic benefits of membership. 9 The official presentation of the EEC as a regional trading bloc, lacking any political design, persisted in the 1970s and 1980s, when the organisation was popularly known as the 'Common Market'. Yet there was a growing sense of federalist ambition. After accession,
Britain struggled to accept policies on which the other members had agreed, including fishing quotas, agricultural prices and budgetary and fiscal policies. At the same time, the government 4 was anxious about the public response to the economic slump of 1970s, when the Labour grassroots blamed inflation and unemployment on the 'capitalist club' of the EEC and voted against continued membership. It was partly to allay these concerns that Labour, now in power, held a referendum on membership in 1975. Although two-thirds of the electorate voted to remain, the result was less an expression of public enthusiasm than of a well-oiled government campaign that emphasised the dangers of departure. 10 11 By this stage, the Prime Minister was seen by many as a liability to the nation's standing in the EEC: as novelists described it, Britain was now 'the problem child of Europe'
and 'the spoilsport in Europe'. 12 The frustration was shared by the growing number of pro- It Here ('As Kingsley Amis might put it, I am a nut case about abroad'), allows her characters sojourns in Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands, and even permits 'quasiessential trips to the continent', but these speak less about the travelled environment than about the cultural cachet of the traveller. 23 Novelists even disparage the foreign locations which characters visit: a stay in Paris proves 'a tedious torment', a tour of Greece proves 'disappointing' and an anecdote about a holiday in Tuscany causes listeners a 'mingling of incredulity and horror'. 24 The same lack of engagement is seen in narratives set wholly or partly In January 1962 lots of people were disputing: will Britain get into it? Ought Britain to get into it? And so on. I'd bet that in 1972 those conversations reported in a novel will read as flat as the flat-earther's earth. By then our country will either be in the Common Market, in which case everyone will have forgotten we were kept out. Or we shall have been permanently kept out, in which case everyone will have forgotten we tried to get in. Or the Common Market will no longer be in existence in its present form, anyway. Paris. Deeply conservative in her politics, Mitford may be expected to use the narrative for patriotic purposes, especially considering her views on integration; writing in the Sunday Times in 1952, she was adamant that 'non-co-operation' was Britain's proper strategy and that 'it is impossible for us to join any sort of federation'. 28 The emphasis on national autonomy appears in earlier sections of the text where Fanny not only dreams that her husband will 'become one of those plenipotentiaries whose names are ever remembered with gratitude and respect', but is also delighted to find the British Embassy cut off from the city around, forming 'a haven of delight' that 'has more the atmosphere of a country than a town house'. At the same time, their commitment to collective labour suggests a 'peasant ideal of equality
[that] recognizes a world of scarcity' and that promises both a 'fraternal aid in struggling against this scarcity and a just sharing of what the work produces'. 47 As importantly, the known communities of the countryside retain an oral tradition that has been lost in urban European society, allowing them to evade identification with the dominant order through the act of selfrepresentation:
What distinguishes the life of a village is that it is also a living portrait of itself: a communal portrait, in that everybody is portrayed and everybody portrays.
[…] Every villager's portrait of itself is constructed […] out of words, spoken and remembered: out of opinions, stories, eye-witness reports, legends, comments and hearsay. And it is a continuous portrait; work on it never stops. 48 While Berger accepts that peasant economics are not akin to communism, which is progressive in sentiment, he refuses to believe that the peasantry is a force for conservatism. Any tendency towards traditional social and economic arrangements is justified by the direct challenge they present to the organising principles of corporate capitalism: as Berger writes, '[a]n intact peasantry was the only class with an in-built resistance to consumerism. When a peasantry is dispersed, markets are enlarged'. 49 It is this resistance that explains the EEC's urge for destruction. Under the guise of 'modernisation', Brussels is bringing the countryside under metropolitan control through a mechanisation of production and a specialisation of the market, increasing the economic plight of the countryside and the economic pull of the cities. 'Their job is to wipe us out', one character laments: 'On the plains there will be no more peasants'. 50 Although focused on the specific conditions of provincial France, Pig Earth speaks metonymically of the financialisation of agriculture elsewhere in western Europe, as it does of collectivisation in eastern Europe, where rural life was also subject to centralised planning. In this way, the text's notion of Europe, which reiterates Lindsay's socialist internationalism, is much wider than that found in mainstream fiction, which tended to repeat the strict separation of East and West that informed governmental containment policy.
Berger's anxieties about 'Project Europe' became more common in British fiction after Maastricht, which initiated the processes of post-Cold War unification. It is true that quick reference to holidays or business trips to the mainland, interspersed with laments about '"Brussels bureaucrats"' and swipes at '"Euro-fraud"', '"Euro-speak"' and 'conspiratorial Euro-imaginings', continued to dominate literary treatments of integration. 51 But more complex responses not only rose in number, with as many published in the 1990s as the last four decades put together, but also began to fall into distinct generic categories. The first to emerge was a reformulated containment fiction, a literary style which, still informed by Cold control of eastern Europe, despite his misgivings about this '"complicated mega-country"'. 53 The same paranoia informed a series of right-wing dystopias that emerged from the mid-1990s. Europe' or to a right-wing patriot as an '"whitecliffsdover piesmash jellyeels royalvariety british bulldog"', there was no longer any sense that British nationalism was being endorsed. 62 In more recent times, the publication of Ali Smith's Autumn (2016), a sober analysis of post-'Brexit' Britain, may herald a fuller engagement with the EU, although twenty-first century writing has not yet departed from the indifference and hostility that characterised earlier literary periods. 63 Indeed, in the years leading up to 'Brexit' the government's calls for a repatriation of social and economic policy after the credit crunch of 2008, not to mention its grievances over immigration, indicated a public sphere still ill-disposed to supranationalism. As Vernon
Bogdanor points out, for Britain 'to become genuinely European […] would require not only the victory of the pro-Europeans in Westminster, but also a genuine shift in the consciousness of the British people; and of that there is, as yet, no sign'. 64 The literary output of the latter half of the twentieth century was a product of that entrenched consciousness, resistant to the Europeanness that the EU was attempting to nurture through continent-wide culture-building exercises and reflective of a society that had the lowest circulation of literature in translation of any European nation and one of the smallest modern language syllabi in secondary and higher education. When considered against the EU's larger member-states, Britain may not be 'unique in having a continuing aversion or scepticism towards integration', as Simon Bulmer has argued, but is certainly unique in its literary disinterest in the continent of which it is a part. 65 
